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 Andrea Bellini: Professor Crouch, as a start, let us trace briefly the history of  what might be 
deemed “a complicated relationship”, such as that between Britain and the European Union (EU). 
This history began after World War II, when six European countries - Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany - committed themselves to promote the construction 
of  a supranational institutional order, as a way to unify Europe and prevent further war within the 
continent. The first step was the establishment of  the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
with the Treaty of  Paris, in 1951. A Few years later, in 1957, the Treaty of  Rome was signed by the 
same countries, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). In these early stages, Britain 
decided not to become a member. It was in the late 1950s that the British political class changed its 
attitude. An arm wrestling with France, then, followed, since the President in charge, Charles De 
Gaulle, vetoed Britain’s request to join the Common Market. The deadlock was broken only in 1969, 
when De Gaulle resigned and Georges Pompidou became President. Afterwards, negotiations led, in a 
relatively rapid fashion, to the signature of  an accession treaty, in 1972. Britain, thus, officially entered 
the EEC on 1 January 1973. No referendum was held in that circumstance. The idea of  holding 
a consultative referendum, however, was supported by the Labour Party a year later. This led to the 
enactment of  the Referendum Act of  1975, which set out the rules and procedures for a referendum on 
Britain’s membership of  the European Communities (ECs), that is the first ever national referendum 
in Britain. On 5 June 1975, more than 17 million people (about 67 percent of  total votes) chose 
continued membership of  the ECs. From that moment on, the history of  Britain’s involvement in 
European integration has been controversial, basically a history of  limited participation. In particular, 
Britain obtained “opt-out” clauses, so that it was allowed not to join the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the Schengen Area. The so-called “Brexit” referendum, which was held on 23 
June 2016, four decades after the former consultation, might thus be seen as a culmination of  a long 
history of  suspicion of  the EU. But something has dramatically changed in the relationship. The 
results, in fact, are well known: a slight majority, but a majority nonetheless (almost 52 percent), this 
time, voted for leaving the EU. 
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With the above in mind, a preliminary remark should be made on the reasons why governments call 
referenda on EU-related issues. 23 out of  a total of  43 referenda held in European countries since 
1957, in fact, were not constitutionally required. Both referenda held in Britain, in 1975 and 2016, 
for instance, were called at the discretion of  the government in office. It is likely that such issues, which 
have to do with the national sovereignty of  a state, and therefore are strongly divisive, induce the leaders 
of  government parties to call referenda in order to seek social legitimacy, which would also allow them 
to strengthen their own political position. As the case of  the Brexit referendum has demonstrated, 
nevertheless, this involves risk. Hence, the first point is why running the risk, especially in a perceivable 
climate of  discontent about EU policies, such as those concerning immigration and asylum?
Both the UK’s Europe referenda have been held for the worst of  reasons: to avoid 
major splits in the ruling party. In 1975, the Labour Party was deeply divided over 
Europe, with its left wing wanting to build a “fortress Britain” protectionist economy 
and therefore opposing entry into what was then the EEC. The referendum campaign 
saw the Labour Prime Minister and the leaders of  the Conservative and Liberal parties 
working together for a Yes vote. The opposition to Europe comprised the Labour left, 
and the Conservative nationalist right. As you say, the UK then became a reluctant, 
truculent member of  Europe, always seeking opt-outs. However, on two major issues 
the UK actually played a central role in helping European integration. When Margaret 
Thatcher was Prime Minister, she was a leading advocate of  the single market. Her 
Conservative successor, John Major, and then Labour’s Tony Blair were important in 
encouraging the rest of  the EU to open to the countries of  Central Europe, then 
emerging from the shadow of  the Soviet Union and seeking a new place in the world. 
Ironically, it was consequences of  these two “British” European initiatives that then 
started to turn many British people against the EU. The single market necessarily 
brought the European Court of  Justice to have authority over competition issues 
within the single market. This subordination of  UK practices to a European Court 
offended the deep nationalism of  many Conservatives. Then, extension to the 
East brought immigrants from Poland and other Central European countries. This 
encouraged xenophobic groups who were already hostile to Britain’s existing immigrant 
populations. Hostility to immigrants and foreigners in general could be talked about in 
the con-text of  hostility to the EU, disguising the racism that underlay the hostility to 
immigrants. These issues produced a major growth of  anti-EU sentiment within the 
Conservative Party, though as the UK’s most pro-business party it also contained many 
strongly pro-Europeanists. Like Labour in 1975, the party leadership saw a referendum 
as the only way to resolve the intra-party conflict.
AB: It is clear that the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, did not interpret correctly the social 
situation in the country. In order to better understand what went wrong, it might be helpful to highlight 
the differences between the situation in 1975 and 2016. In both cases, in effect, Britain was affected 
by the consequences of  a world economic downturn, which brought growing political and social tensions.
The new issue in 2016 was immigration from Central Europe, and the way in which 
the anti-Europe campaign linked that immigration to the refugee crisis in the Middle 
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East and North Africa, and linked that in turn to Islamic terrorism. These links were 
irrational, but they were very powerfully and emotionally presented. There were other 
issues, such as general discontent with political elites, as well as nostalgia for Britain’s 
days as an island nation with a global empire, but these mobilised only a minority. It 
was the immigrant-refugee-terrorist link that turned that minority into a small majority.
AB: In between the two referenda, the EMU was created. Britain’s signing of  the Maastricht Treaty, 
in 1992, gave rise to a long and passionate debate on the possibility that the country would adopt the 
single currency. Euroscepticism, then, spread rapidly. It developed in the Conservative Party, but it also 
found expression in populist political parties, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
and the Referendum Party. This latter, particularly, was a single-issue party, which gained consensus by 
invoking the necessity of  a referendum on EU membership. The victory of  Tony Blair’s Labour Party 
at the general election, in 1997, then, avoided the possibility of  a referendum. Eurosceptics, in effect, 
were still in the minority at that time. Britain, however, never joined the EMU. Why? What was the 
dominant feeling about the euro among the British people?
Among the people at large the main issue was a symbolic pride in the pound sterling, 
linked again to that nostalgia for the imperial past. Among political and financial circles 
there was a more sophisticated but still nostalgic concern for the pound’s history 
alongside the US dollar as a reserve currency - it has not been a reserve currency for 
several decades, but there is still nostalgia for it. Then, on the left and centre, there was 
concern that the euro would be too strongly based on the Bundesbank’s hard money 
approach, making Keynesian demand management difficult. Danish and Swedish social 
democrats took the same view, as did Keynesian economists in other EU countries. In 
retrospect, they were right. It is interesting to reflect that, if  the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden had all sought to get a more Keynesian approach in the European Central 
Bank in exchange for joining the euro, the single currency might have been better 
managed in the current crisis.
AB: The impression from the outside is that, in any case, Euroscepticism was a latent sentiment, 
which was always present, though less visible, a “ticking bomb” set to go off  at some unknown time in 
the future. What was the detonator, then, and how was it triggered? As a matter of  fact, Brexit has 
occurred at a time of  “multiple” crises: the refugee crisis, in fact, is only the last one in chronological 
order. Is this the main difference with the situation in 1975?
Absolutely. As I have already said, it was immigration from Central Europe, 
combined with the completely dishonest linking of  immigrants, refugees and terrorists 
by the pro-Brexit campaign, that turned a large minority of  anti-European opinion into 
a majority.
AB: What is noteworthy is that voters - at least, the majority of  them - have ignored the warnings of  
influential experts about the economic costs of  leaving the EU. On 20 June 2016, three days before the 
referendum, for instance, some economists predicted that leaving the EU would damage the economic 
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prospects of  the British people: «lower real wages; a lower value of  the pound - and hence higher prices 
for goods and services; higher borrowing, lower public spending or higher taxes; in the short run, higher 
unemployment»1. Feeling and emotion, thus, seem to have prevailed on reason. Is this a sign that the 
relationship between the British people and the EU is compromised, so much so that they are willing 
to run such a high risk? If  so, is it a question of  idiosyncrasy to the “Brussels bureaucracy” or is it 
more a consequence of  a nationalist revival?
It is important to put the Brexit referendum alongside Donald Trump’s campaign 
for the US presidency. In some ways, they are part of  the same movement. Parts of  the 
Brexit and Trump teams worked alongside each other, developing ways of  stirring up 
anxieties about terrorism and linking it to other issues through a series of  emotional 
links. Specific things like “Brussels bureaucracy” are brought into this frame, but behind 
it is something deeper. I prefer to look at it this way: mass democratic participation 
requires both reason (to enable us to relate specific electoral and policy choices to our 
understanding of  our values and interests) and emotion (to motivate us to participate 
and care enough). If  the emotions are neglected, politics becomes a technocratic game, 
played primarily by those with a strong calculating sense of  their material interests. In 
recent decades, we have been slipping into that position - it is linked to what I have 
described as post-democracy2. People who feel excluded by technocratic politics can 
fight back by denigrating the role of  reason and stressing emotion instead. This is what 
Trump and the Brexit campaign managed to exploit. But if  reason is neglected, we get 
“post-truth” (i.e. systematic lies) and a manipulation of  mass passions that lead straight 
to fascism.
There is then a second aspect. We seem to take it for granted that people know who 
they are politically, and can make political choices and identify with parties. But, since 
political issues are so complex and remote from our everyday lives, why should we 
expect ourselves to be able to do this? I think it works in the following way: if  we have 
a social identity that acquires clear political implications, we can then acquire a basic 
understanding of  political identity and choice. Historically, in European countries class 
and religious identities performed that task for us. But they are weakening now. All that 
is left for many people is a sense of  who they are nationally, and nationality is both 
social and political. Given globalization, immigration, refugee crises and a general sense 
of  danger presented by “foreigners”, the political meaning of  identity can become 
increasingly intense. This is what is happening, and, if  we remember the 1920s and 
1930s, it is very dangerous.
AB: Going more deeply into the matter, who voted in favour of  Leave? In other words, how does the 
Brexit vote interrelate with the class divide?
Leave voters tended to be older than Remain voters, more likely to be men, and 
to live in small towns (both prosperous and declining ones) rather than large cities. 
1 Chadha J., Johnson P., Van Reenen J. (2016), Leaving the EU would Almost Certainly Damage our Economic 
Prospects, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
2 Crouch C. (2004), Post-Democracy, Cambridge: Polity.
258 Colin Crouch
Cambio. Rivista sulle trasformazioni sociali, VI, 12, 2016
Working class people in ex-industrial cities in the North tended to vote Leave, but 
well-off  people in the rich South formed a larger proportion of  the Leave vote. The 
more educated people were, the more likely they were to want to remain in Europe. 
Labour and Liberal Party supporters were far more likely to vote Remain than were 
Conservatives. The class divide is therefore highly complex. In general, those who voted 
Leave were those who were in various ways unhappy with the modern world, whether 
because they had experienced economic decline, or because they disliked having to 
have dealings for foreigners, or because they believed Britain ought to be a global 
power in its own right again, or because they were unhappy that people from ethnic 
minorities were playing an increasingly prominent role. Again, there are considerable 
similarities with the Trump voters in the USA.
AB: In a recent article, you said that Brexit is «the loss of  the future»3. Can you explain what you 
meant?
This follows from what I have just said. The supporters of  remaining in Europe 
were younger, better educated, and tended to work in the more dynamic sectors of  
the economy. In other words, people who represented the future. Many families 
experienced conflict after the referendum, with elderly supporters of  Brexit being 
criticised by sons, daughters and grandchildren for “destroying their future”. Theresa 
May is now trying to present the Brexit move as an expression of  an outward-looking, 
internationalist and entrepreneurial country. But that was not the demography of  the 
people who voted for it.
AB: In your opinion, is it possible to identify new “social blocs” that have formed around Brexit and 
that are likely to influence the general elections in the immediate future?
We are possibly seeing the emergence of  a liberal left that represents a concern 
for public services, a tolerant and welcoming attitude to diversity, and a right that 
is nationalistic. There are then big questions: what happens in this framework to 
neo-liberals, who find both alternatives unattractive? And which side is best able to 
champion egalitarianism? These issues are being worked out in most of  Europe and in 
the USA; they will take a long time to develop, and the outcomes will vary from country 
to country. The UK is in an unusual position, since the economic consequences of  
Brexit are going to put us through some distinctive crises.
AB: Looking ahead, what does Brexit really mean for Britain? The new Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, set the tone by supporting economic interventionism and by promising stringent controls on 
immigration. Is, thus, Britain turning against neo-liberalism?
It is best to take little notice of  what Theresa May says, and wait for what she 
eventually does. At her party conference in October she attacked people with liberal 
3  Crouch C. (2016), Brexit, la sconfitta del futuro dai lavori del passato, in «Pagina99», 1 July.
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opinions who wanted to be what she called “citizens of  the world”. Such people 
belonged nowhere, she argued, and cared nothing for the people of  their own country. 
Then, in her big Brexit speech in January she virtually presented the whole of  Britain 
as being open to the world. Yes, she has talked about economic intervention to ease the 
problems of  working people. But she has also been “warning” the EU, that unless the 
UK is allowed special privileges, we shall change our “economic model”, and become a 
deregulated economy with very low business taxes. That has to mean an economy with 
few workers’ rights and either very regressive taxation or much reduced public services. 
There is only one thing about which she has been consistent over the years: her dislike 
of  immigrants.
AB: And what does it imply for Europe? The relatively recent history of  the EU has been marked 
by a certain tension between British neo-liberalism and German neo-corporatism. Examples of  
compromises between these two dominant souls can be found in the arenas of  labour law and industrial 
relations, e.g. in the long and winding roads towards the implementation of  the directives on European 
Works Councils and the European Company Statute. The future of  these institutions, in Britain, 
relies on the promise of  the government in office that all EU legislation will be translated into national 
law. In actual fact, it is seriously threatened by the pressures of  Eurosceptics, Conservatives and 
business organizations. Do you think that Brexit, from this point of  view, is only a problem for 
Britons or could it, instead, affect employee rights in Europe overall?
In general, Brexit will obviously hurt the remaining 27 members of  the EU as well 
as the UK itself. An organisation cannot lose its second biggest member without some 
cost. That is why other EU countries are rightly angry with us for such an irresponsible 
act. The bigger problems you refer to would follow if  the UK really does carry out its 
threat to try to become a giant offshore tax haven with workers’ rights little better than 
those in China. This could set up an ugly “race to the bottom”. However, in making 
such a move the UK would risk doing itself  considerable social, economic and political 
damage. More optimistically, such a threat from the UK might encourage the EU to 
protect its member states from that kind of  competition with sanctions against tax 
havens, etc.
AB: On the other hand, could the defection of  a neo-liberal champion, such as Britain, lead to the 
relaunch of  the European Social Model, in the long run?
The UK has not been the only neo-liberal champion within the EU, but it has 
certainly been the leader and the most powerful. If  we combine its defection with 
growing realisation within the EU that the simple neo-liberal austerity strategy is not 
working in Southern Europe, and growing understand of  the importance of  the social 
in-vestment welfare state for economic and social strength - we have the ingredients for 
a return of  the Delors-Prodi model for Europe. It is at least possible.
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AB: We have come to the end of  the interview. Are there any concluding remarks that you would like 
to add?
Brexit, Trump, Le Pen, the rise of  neo-Nazis in the Nordic countries are all creating 
a crisis on the political right, between its neo-liberal and its nationalistic wings. In the 
long run, these two are incompatible. In a curious way, social democracy stands between 
them - sharing liberalism with neo-liberals and a belief  in an active social state with the 
nationalists. Can neo-liberals and social democrats form new social compromises to 
save us from a lurch into xenophobia and international conflict? Will social democrats 
suppress their liberalism in order to climb on to the semi-fascist bandwagon of  right-
wing populism? Will neo-liberals prefer to make self-contradictory deals with the 
populists in order to keep social democracy out of  power? These are the main choices 
that will gradually emerge to confront all advanced countries in the coming years.
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